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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The amici curiae are law professors who teach and write on civil procedure
and/or patent law and policy.1 As such, amici are interested in the effective
functioning of the courts and the patent system in general. Amici believe that this
Court’s rigid rule restricting personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment
actions both flouts Supreme Court precedent and frustrates the public policy of
clearing invalid patents. Although amici hold different views on other aspects of
modern patent law and policy, they are united in their professional opinion that this
Court should overturn its inflexible jurisdictional rule.
Amici have no stake in the parties or in the outcome of the case. A complete
list of amici appears at Appendix A.

1

No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or part; no party or party’s
counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief;
and no person other than amici, their members, or counsel contributed money
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5).
Additionally, all parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
1

INTRODUCTION
Beginning with its 1998 decision in Red Wing Shoe Co. v. HockersonHalberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), this Court has embraced a
rigid, bright-line rule for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory
judgment actions. Specifically, the Court has held, based on “policy
considerations unique to the patent context,” Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l
Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted), that
contacts created through unsuccessful attempts to license a patent can never be
sufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction over a patent holder. In contrast
to that rigid, patent-specific rule, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that the analysis of personal jurisdiction “is not susceptible of mechanical
application,” Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978), and has instead
required a case-by-case inquiry into the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
and considerations of “fair play and substantial justice,” Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Applying
the analysis mandated by Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that personal
jurisdiction exists in declaratory judgment actions, such as this one, where the
patent holder purposefully targeted the forum state by sending demand letters into
the state and engaging in in-person meetings in the state with the specific purpose
of licensing the patents-in-suit.
2

In addition, important public policy interests support allowing courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over patentees who engage in patent licensing
activities targeted at the forum state. The Supreme Court and Congress have
consistently emphasized a strong public policy in clearing invalid patents from the
marketplace. The Declaratory Judgment Act furthers this policy by allowing
accused infringers to obtain a decision on patent validity at a reasonable time and
in a reasonable place. The rigid rule established by Red Wing Shoe, however,
frustrates the goal of encouraging patent challenges by granting patent holders
unilateral control over where a declaratory judgment suit may be filed.
For these reasons, the Court should sua sponte consider this case en banc to
overturn the restrictive jurisdictional rule established by Red Wing Shoe.
ARGUMENT
I.

Red W ing Shoe’s Bright-Line Rule Conflicts with Controlling Supreme
Court Precedent and Is Inconsistent with This Court’s Own Case Law
Personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant has purposefully established

minimum contacts with the forum state such that it “should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In addition, the personal jurisdiction analysis is informed by
considerations of “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464.
Once a defendant has been shown to possess sufficient minimum contacts, the
burden shifts to that defendant, who must present a “compelling case” as to why
3

the exercise of personal jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. at 477. In making the
highly fact-intensive inquiry into personal jurisdiction, “the facts of each case must
be weighed to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are
present.” Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 (internal quotations omitted); accord Burger King,
471 U.S. at 485 (“[W]e . . . reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas.”).
In contrast to the case-specific inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court, this
Court in Red Wing Shoe adopted a bright-line rule that fairness considerations
always prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on cease-and-desist
letters sent into the forum state. See 148 F.3d at 1360–61. Relying on what the
Court later characterized as “policy considerations unique to the patent context,”
Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1333, the Court reasoned that grounding personal jurisdiction
on cease-and-desist letters would discourage settlement of disputed claims, thus
failing to comport with principles of fairness, Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 1361.
Since Red Wing Shoe, this Court has consistently applied and expanded this
inflexible rule. In Avocent, for example, the Court made clear that “[f]or the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with fair play and substantial justice,
there must be ‘other activities’ directed at the forum [state] . . . besides the letters
threatening an infringement suit,” 552 F.3d at 1334 (internal quotations omitted),
and that these “other activities” must “relate to the enforcement or the defense of
the validity of the relevant patents,” id. (emphasis omitted). Applying Red Wing
4

Shoe, and over the dissent of Judge Newman, the Court ignored the contacts
created through multiple cease-and-desist letters and then held that the patent
holder’s sales of products in the forum state were also not sufficient to create
jurisdiction over the patent owner in a declaratory judgment action. Id. at 1337.
Most recently, in Autogenomics, Inc., v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012
(Fed. Cir. 2009), the Court, again over the dissent of Judge Newman, applied Red
Wing Shoe and held there was no jurisdiction over a patent holder who had sent
cease-and-desist letters into the forum state, engaged in licensing negotiations in
the forum state, and entered license agreements concerning the patents-in-suit with
numerous companies located in the forum state. Id. at 1014–15, 1019–21.
The bright-line rule embraced in Red Wing Shoe, Avocent, and
Autogenomics—that contacts formed through cease-and-desist letters and
unsuccessful licensing negotiations can never be sufficient to create personal
jurisdiction—is plainly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Although this
Court correctly recognized that cease-and-desist letters and concomitant licensing
efforts give rise to sufficient minimum contacts, see Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at
1360, it deviated from Supreme Court precedent by adopting an inflexible rule that
such contacts should never, in fairness, give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court delineated five factors for
courts to consider in evaluating whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair:
5

(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute,” (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,”
(4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies,” and (5) the states’ shared interest “in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.” 444 U.S. at 292. Under these factors, the
defendant must make a “compelling case” that its particular burdens outweigh the
other interests implicated in the case before the court. See Charles W. Rhodes,
Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 567,
640–41 (2007) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). Such a showing is
exceedingly rare.2 Nowhere in Red Wing Shoe or its progeny, however, did this
Court balance those factors under the particular circumstances presented. Instead,
the Court effectively ignored the Supreme Court’s mandated analysis in favor of a
pro-settlement policy.
A proper application of the fairness factors illustrates that in certain cases—
including the one currently before the Court—personal jurisdiction is proper when
a defendant has sent a cease-and-desist letter or engaged in other licensing
2

Only once has the Supreme Court held that fairness considerations precluded
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (rejecting jurisdiction in a dispute by a
Taiwanese tire manufacturer against its Japanese supplier, noting that “the
international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight
interests of the plaintiff and the forum State” made “the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a California court . . . unreasonable and unfair”).
6

activities directed at the plaintiff within a forum. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent
Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 43,
90–97 (2010) (discussing how the fairness factors favor personal jurisdiction over
certain patent holders who send cease-and-desist letters). Here, there is simply no
evidence that it would be particularly burdensome for the patent owner, Papst, to
defend this action in California. Indeed, representatives of Papst have previously
traveled to California on several occasions to convince the plaintiffs-appellants to
purchase licenses to the patents-in-suit. Moreover, California is a “convenient and
effective” forum for the plaintiffs-appellants, who are headquartered there. WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. And California plainly has an interest in
adjudicating a dispute involving allegations that California-based companies are
committing patent infringement in California.
Indeed, it would be manifestly unfair not to exercise jurisdiction under these
circumstances. Under Red Wing Shoe, patentees like Papst can use their patent
rights as a sword—for example, by sending letters into California accusing the
plaintiffs-appellants of infringement, meeting with the plaintiffs-appellants’ agents
in California, and extracting licensing revenue from California residents—but also
be shielded from jurisdiction in California. In short, in declaratory judgment cases
such as this one, the patent owner cannot make a “compelling case” that the
exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair.
7

Furthermore, Red Wing Shoe’s narrow approach to specific personal
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions is inconsistent with this Court’s own
case law. For instance, when patent holders initiate infringement suits, they have
broad ability to hale accused infringers into federal court in practically any state.
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444, 1451 (2010);
Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889, 920–22 (2001); see also Beverly Hills
Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding
personal jurisdiction over accused infringers who “purposefully shipped the
accused [product] into [the forum state] through an established distribution
channel”).3
Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule is also inconsistent with the weight that this
Court has given to licensing activity when assessing the presence of a domestic
industry in patent cases before the International Trade Commission (ITC). In an
action before the ITC, the complaint must establish the existence or imminent
establishment of a domestic industry for the articles protected by the asserted
3

It should be noted that a recent petition for a writ of mandamus in In re TC
Heartland, LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), has urged the Court
to overrule its case law conferring sweeping power over forum selection on
patent infringement plaintiffs. Although amici in this case take no position on
the merits of the TC Heartland petition, the petition highlights the importance
of forum-selection issues in modern patent law, including the question of
personal jurisdiction raised by this declaratory judgment case.
8

patent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2). The statute further provides that “an industry in
the United States shall be considered to exist if there is in the United States, with
respect to the articles . . . (c) substantial investment in its . . . licensing.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(3). This Court has interpreted that language to allow the finding of a
domestic industry when the only activity conducted by a patentee in the United
States is licensing its patents. See, e.g., InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. ITC, 690
F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Yet, under Red Wing Shoe, that same
licensing activity would not grant a federal court personal jurisdiction over the
patent holder in a declaratory judgment action.
Finally, this case is an ideal vehicle for reconsidering the law of personal
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions, as the district court’s holding was
based squarely on the bright-line rule of Red Wing Shoe. After cataloguing the
patent holder’s extensive contacts with California, the court wrote that those
contacts were “either related solely to [the patent holder’s] attempts to license the
patents, which the Federal Circuit has held insufficient, or according to Federal
Circuit law [we]re irrelevant to the parties’ instant dispute.” (Order Granting
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 23, N.D. Cal. ECF No. 57, Case No. 5:14-cv-04794LHK, N.D. Cal. ECF No. 62, Case No. 5:14-cv-04963-LHK.) Moreover, panels
and judges of this Court have expressed concern about the wisdom of Red Wing
Shoe and its progeny. See, e.g., Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1341 (Newman, J.,
9

dissenting) (“The entirety of the contacts with the forum . . . supports the exercise
of personal jurisdiction . . . comporting with the principles of personal jurisdiction
as elaborated by the Supreme Court.”); see also Autogenomics, Inc., 566 F.3d at
1021 (“Although we . . . are concerned that foreign patentees . . . may engage in
significant commercialization and licensing efforts in a state . . . we are
nonetheless bound by Avocent.”); id. at 1028 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The
court’s decision that [the patent holder] cannot be brought before the court . . . is
contrary to law, precedent, and policy.”).
II.

Public Policy Supports the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Based on
Licensing Efforts
Under a proper, case-by-case inquiry into personal jurisdiction, district

courts would be permitted to hear declaratory judgment actions when the defendant
has engaged in licensing efforts and activity directed at the forum state. Not only
does Supreme Court precedent mandate this result, public policy considerations
also warrant it.
First, Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule defeats the core patent policy of
encouraging challenges to patent validity. The Supreme Court has “emphasized
the importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent invalidity.”
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l., Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (internal
citation omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has promulgated a “group of
authorities [that] encourage authoritative testing of patent validity.” Blonder10

Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 (1971). In
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), for example, the Court
permitted an alleged infringer to file a declaratory judgment action even though the
alleged infringer continued to comply with a licensing agreement. And, in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), the
Court held that courts could not shift the burden of proof on the question of
infringement to the alleged infringer simply because the suit sought a declaratory
judgment.
Like the Supreme Court, Congress has, in recent years, acted to facilitate
quick and inexpensive challenges to patent validity. That was, in fact, a major
purpose of the recently enacted America Invents Act (AIA). See Joe Matal, A
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed.
Cir. B.J. 539, 599–601 (2011–2012). During deliberation on the AIA, the House
Judiciary Committee noted the “growing sense that questionable patents are too
easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge” and emphasized that a key
objective of the legislation was “providing a more efficient system for challenging
patents that should not have issued[] and reducing unwarranted litigation costs.”
H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011). Although the AIA created several new
administrative procedures to challenge patent validity, declaratory judgment
actions remain an important tool for accused infringers, particularly those who
11

have strong arguments on noninfringement—an issue the PTO is powerless to
decide—or who have invalidity arguments that are beyond the scope of PTO
review. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (limiting inter partes review to novelty and
nonobviousness).
There is, to be sure, a robust debate among scholars about whether the PTO
issues too many “bad patents”—that is, patents that are overly broad or that
represent only marginal improvements in the state of the art. See Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 279–80 (2015) (citing commentary).
Amici differ amongst themselves as to the scope or even the existence of a “bad
patents” problem and whether it should be a major cause of concern in patent
policy. They are, however, united in their professional opinion that declaratory
judgment actions serve an important patent-clearing function and that the lower
court’s decision in this case, based on Red Wing Shoe and its progeny, raises
improper barriers to the declaratory judgment action’s critical function in patent
suits.
Second, the bright-line prohibition on personal jurisdiction adopted in Red
Wing Shoe undermines the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Congress
enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to open federal courts to “parties confronted
with uncertainties in their legal and business relations, but who had no resort to the
12

courts because the other party possessed the cause of action.” Lisa A. Dolak,
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance
Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 903, 910 (1997).
The extensive hearings held on the Declaratory Judgment Act in the years leading
up to its enactment reveal that alleged patent infringers were among the
beneficiaries specifically contemplated. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B.
Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause
of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn’t
Looking, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 529, 561–73 (1989) (providing a summary of the
fifteen-year legislative history). In particular, during hearings on an earlier version
of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Professor Edson R. Sunderland testified:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You
claim that you have a patent. What am I going to do
about it? There is no way that I can litigate my right,
which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead
and using it, and you [the patent holder] can sit back as
long as you please and let me run up just as high a bill of
damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you
may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having
acted all the time in good faith and on my best judgment,
but having no way in the world to find out whether I had
a right to use that device or not.
Id. at 564 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1928)). Based on this history,

13

“Congress clearly contemplated . . . permit[ting] federal declaratory judgment
actions by alleged patent infringers.” Id. at 570.
Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act “allow[s] potential infringers to ‘clear
the air’ by seeking declaratory relief in federal court instead of waiting for the
patent owner to file an infringement suit.” Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases
and Public Controversies, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 361, 367 (2013). In so doing,
the Declaratory Judgment Act “gives the alleged infringer the additional benefit of
choosing the forum and the time of the suit.” Kimberly A. Moore, Timothy R.
Holbrook & John F. Murphy, Patent Litigation and Strategy 52 (4th ed. 2013).
Unfortunately, the bright-line rule of Red Wing Shoe deprives accused
infringers of one of the primary advantages of the declaratory judgment action—
the ability to control the forum. Of course, an accused infringer should not be able
to choose any federal court at will. But it should, consistent with the purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act, be able to bring suit in a forum with which the
patent holder has constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts.
Third, Red Wing Shoe’s bright-line rule improperly elevates the promotion
of settlement over numerous other important policy considerations. See Megan M.
La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 375, 429–
30 (2014). As noted, the Court in Red Wing Shoe based its refusal of jurisdiction
primarily on a perceived “policy favoring settlement” of patent infringement
14

claims. 148 F.3d at 1361. Although pre-suit communications can sometimes
promote settlement of patent disputes, that is not invariably true, as the Court
assumed in Red Wing Shoe. For instance, in recent years, some patent holders
have used demand letters for the sole purpose of extracting nuisance-value
licensing payments. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101
Va. L. Rev. 1579, 1581–82 (2015); Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-andDesist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. Rev. 411, 423–24 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & A.
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2117,
2126 (2013). In this context, the “promotion of settlement” rationale of Red Wing
Shoe has no application.
Moreover, recent Supreme Court precedent casts doubt on this Court’s
assumption that settlement of patent disputes is always in the public’s interest. See
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). In Actavis, the Supreme Court
rejected a bright-line rule (which this Court had embraced) that settlement
payments within the scope of a patent were immune from antitrust scrutiny, instead
holding that those settlements should be evaluated under the rule of reason. Id. at
2237. Despite a “general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes,” the
Court ruled that settlements in the patent context demanded some scrutiny,
emphasizing the “policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will
not continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
15

justification.” Id. at 2233–34 (internal citations omitted). Thus, while promotion
of settlement no doubt remains a laudable goal in some contexts, Red Wing Shoe
fails to balance that goal against other policy interests in the patent context,
including clearing invalid patents.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should sua sponte consider this case en
banc in order to abrogate Red Wing Shoe and its progeny. The Court should
instead apply the case-specific analysis of personal jurisdiction mandated by
Supreme Court precedent. Applying that precedent to the facts of this case, it is
clear that personal jurisdiction exists because the patent holder purposefully
targeted the forum state by sending demand letters into the state and engaging in
in-person meetings in the state with the specific purpose of licensing the patentsin-suit.
Dated: December 21, 2015
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/s/ Harrison J. Frahn IV
Harrison J. Frahn IV
Matthew K. Telford
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
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St. Thomas University School of Law

18

Professor Ira Steven Nathenson
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South Texas College of Law
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Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Professor Christopher B. Seaman
Washington and Lee University School of Law
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University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)
Professor Howard M. Wasserman
Florida International University College of Law
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